As Al Jazeera reported, the Bureau of Industry and Security, the export-control arm of the US Commerce Department, announced a rule aimed at stopping Chinese AI developers from getting around existing restrictions by remotely accessing advanced computing power at data centers in third countries. In the same move, BIS designated Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil as destinations with an “unacceptable risk of diversion,” meaning exports of advanced chips to those countries will now require a US license.
The legal hinge is straightforward. Washington had already restricted exports and transfers of the most advanced chips to firms based in China. What remained, at least according to the administration, was a cleaner-looking workaround: keep the hardware outside China, then let Chinese users tap the computing power remotely. The chip did not cross the border. The capability did. Regulators have now decided that distinction was generous to the point of self-parody.
Authority here matters. BIS sits inside the Commerce Department and writes and enforces these export rules. This is not a court ruling, not a finding of liability, and not a criminal judgment against any company. It is an administrative action changing the conditions under which advanced US computing technology can be shipped abroad.
The rule also arrives in the middle of a much louder political mess. Al Jazeera said the restrictions come amid scrutiny of Nvidia following allegations involving former CEO Jensen Huang and Alice Huang, a former executive at Singapore-based data center company Megaspeed. Beijing has denied the spying allegations reported by unnamed US officials, calling them groundless. Alice Huang has not publicly commented, Al Jazeera said.
What is established on the record is narrower, and narrower is usually where the law lives. The Commerce Department and the Justice Department publicly confirmed that investigators opened a criminal investigation into Megaspeed, according to Al Jazeera. The Commerce Department said it had begun investigating the company for potential export-control violations in 2024, and that BIS officials later conducted an on-site inspection and interviewed Alice Huang before the Justice Department took the lead role in the criminal investigation. An investigation is an exercise of suspicion backed by state power; it is not a conviction, however obligingly markets may blur the paperwork.
Singapore’s government said it was studying the measure and speaking with affected companies and US authorities about scope and implementation. It also said it did not condone companies using Singapore to “circumvent or violate” other countries’ laws. That is a neat summary of the position many intermediary jurisdictions prefer: open for business, not interested in becoming evidence.
The incentive change is the point. If third-country data centers had become a lawful-looking relay for restricted computing power, this rule raises the cost of building that relay with US chips. It also pushes the commercial pain outward, onto countries that host data-center growth and onto companies that had benefited from being close enough to demand and far enough from the original ban.
The administration calls the measure a “logical extension” of existing controls. Logical, perhaps. Also expensive, diplomatically awkward, and a reminder that export law now spends less time watching the crate and more time wondering who gets the password.
Alex de Valletta
Gabriel Fenech
Ryan C
Dua Mifsud